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Historicism, Nationalism, and Ethics: 
Some Reflections on the "New" South Africa 
Adam Muller 
University of Manitoba 
"There are no people without history, or who can be understood 
without it. Their history, like ours, is incomprehensible outside its 
setting in a wider world (which has become coterminous with the 
inhabited globe) and, certainly, in the past half-millennium it cannot 
be understood except through the intersections of di fferent types of 
social organization, each modified by interaction with the others" 
(Eric Hobsbawm, All Peoples Have History, 1998) 
The argument I wish to advance in this paper builds upon the claim that history plays a consti tutiV"e 
role in the imagined community found at the heart of the modern nation state. Citizens, on this view, 
come to recognize themselves as such at least partly in virtue of the stories they tell and hear tol d 
about themselves , their attachments to their homeland, as well as about the homeland itself. This i.s 
not a new idea; it has been espoused in one form or another by political philosophers at least sine e 
the nineteenth century. But its longevity has done little to diminish its present contentiousness. Part 
of the problem with the claim is that the terms "Ahistory", "nation", and "community", in virtueCllf 
their referential ambiguities and implication in a mise-en-abyme of postmodernist scepticisms, have 
proven very difficult to work with. Of these terms "history" is perhaps the most troublesome, and 
has been so more or less since the time of Herodotus . But it is in the wake of postmodemisrn and its 
disciplinary and methodological corollaries (cultural studies , relativism, anti-realism) thaI history 
in the traditional sense has become almost undoable, as well as undone. Indeed it would be fairtu 
say, as a number of practicing historians have said, that history is currently in a state of crisis , one 
with serious implications for our thinking about nationalism, and one with no immediate end in 
sight. 
Perhaps nowhere have the problems with "history" been more fully revealed in recent years than in 
South AfIica, a country struggling to define itself nationally in marked contrast to its racist past. But 
the past in South Africa, as in so many other nations in the midst of political and social 
reconfiguration, is not all that easily identified as such. The line between fact and fiction , often fine, 
can sometimes disappear completely, hidden by the language of political self-justification common 
to victors and vanquished alike. By way of redressing this problem, and in recognition of its 
significance to the ongoing stability of the "new" South Africa, the Mandela government in 1995 
established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) whose dual mandate was to determine 
what actually happened duIing the struggle against apartheid and to decide what shouldconsequently 
be done about it. 
The TRC fascinates me for a number of reasons, but one of the most significant of these is that its 
activities speak loudly of the interrelationship of history and ethics. As J will go on to show, the 
TRC's formal raison d'etre was to redress past injustices , to offer a form of moral solace to those 
previously unable or unwilling to receive it. But in order to adjudicate fairly and with equanimity 
its commissioners needed to be properly informed; to be properly informed, of course, they needed 
to know what had happened in South AfIica's prisons, townships, and bushveldt, as well as in 
Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. The commissioners, in short , needed to know the Truth about 
apartheid. Only then could justice be served. History, truth, and ethics were thus conjoined in the 
operational mandate of the TRC, and in a way that raises interesting problems for historicists. 
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Historicism is not a new idea, indeed it reflects some structural ambiguities in the practice of history 
which, it has been argued, I go all the way back to the methodological pecuJiari ties of Herodotu s 
(fabulism) and Thucydides (documentarism). At issue in a comparison of their respective methods, 
and of central importance to historicism more generally, is the role played by context in shaping ou r 
understanding of the "text" that is the past. Indeed the debate over historicism, which now dominates 
history as never before, can be seen to revol ve around the crucial question of whether ornot it is ever 
really possible to know something about the past, "knowing the past" here meaning "comprehend 
it objectively" in some way independently of our current context: our biases, opinions, and 
multifarious states of mind. The generally agreed upon short answer to this question seems to be 
"no", and for a couple of very good reasons, and yet it is not at all clear what such an answerentails 
for historiography. For some historians, let us call them "presentists", this answer means thall: 
historians should reject the idea that the past can be understood as a discrete constellation of actions 
and events, recoverable through the sustained concentration of historians' energies on appropriate 
forms of evidence. On this view the study of the past can, at most, tell us something about wllo we 
are right now, at this precise moment in time. For others, whom we may call "positivists" , the past: 
can be recovered piece by piece and explained objectively, through the careful identification andl 
interpretation of documents and other appropriate evidence of prior acts and experiences . 
This latter view has come to be associated with the thought of the nineteenth-century historian and 
philosopher Leopold von Ranke, who urged historians "only to show what actually happened" 
("Preface to 'Histories of Romance and Germanic Peoples"' , 1973, p. 57)2. The Rankean position 
dominated historiographical thinking throughout much of the twentieth century, thanks in no small 
'Cf. Hamilton, 1996, pp. 7-13. 
' ''To history has been assigned the office of judging the past, of instructing the present of the 
benefit of future ages. To such high offices this work does not aspire: It wants only to show what 
actually happened (wie es eigenliich gewesen)" (1973, p. 57) 
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way to the efforts of the English historian Geoffrey Elton. The overarching concern in Elton 's work 
is that what he termed "ideological theory" would force the historian to tailor his evidence to 
explanatory schemes alien to the period under consideration. Thus his claim that the evidence of the 
past must be read "in the context of the day that produced it [ .... ] The present must be kept out of the 
past if the search for the truth of that past is to move towards such success as in the circumstances 
is possible" (quoted in Evans, 1998, p. 75). This last sentence helps to clarify Elton's position in that 
it shows that he accepts that for practical reasons our present understanding of the past must remain 
incomplete. For as Dominic LaCapra has shown, the evidence of past is unevenly distributed in the 
present, and the lens through which the historian views it is therefore of necessity opaque . Thi s 
evidentiary incompleteness for Elton defines what the role of the historian must be : the 
transformation of facts into evidence for arguments about the interconnectedness of events. 
It is to this conception of the historian's craft that the presentists take exception, and it should be 
noted that after struggling for decades the presentists appear to have carried the day. There are 
stronger and weaker versions of the presentist position, though the stronger version is now on the 
ascendant institutionally and currently represents the greatest threat to traditional "history". The 
weaker version of the presentist argument can be identified with the hermeneutic position outlined 
by E.H. Carr (1990), in his seminal text What is History ? For Carr the past must of necessity be 
seen in terms of present concerns and preoccupations, but not statically so. Past and present on hi s 
view exist in dialogue, in what he terms a "coherent relation" (1990, p. 130), with the former 
informing the way in which the historian chooses presently to interrogate it. Some sense of the 
specifics of this dynamic relationship is revealed in the following quote: 
The absolute in history is not something in the past from which we start; it is nOll 
something in the present, since all present thinking is necessarily relative. It i s 
something still incomplete and in process of becoming-something in the futune 
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towards which we move, which begins to take shape only as we move towards it, and 
in the light of which, as we move forward, we gradually shape our interpretation of 
the past (1990, p. 121). 
Carr's thesis, although in several respects dated, nonetheless has proven enduring, and still for many 
students of history represents their first exposure to debates within the field of historiography 0 ver 
such matters as objectivity, context, and values. 
The stronger presentist claim seeks to destroy history, with a capital "H", altogether. One of its most 
vocal proponents is Keith Jenkins, a scholar for whom the postmodem present-a fractured, unstable 
place-renders the line between present and past indistinguishable, and history irrelevant. On 
Jenkins's view: 
it really is history per se that radical postmodemism threatens with extinction [ .... J 
I argue that we can now "forget history" for post modem imaginaries sans hislOire. 
Of course, this doesn't mean to say that the lower case (and other histories) are 
already dead and buried, rather that an argument can be made that history per se is 
just slipping out of conversation; that it does not seem urgent or much to the p()int 
any more. And it is, of course my argument that this is a good thing (Why History?, 
1999, p. 9). 
Just why thi s eradication of historical activity and understanding should be a "good thing" has to do 
with the standard advantages attributed to postmodemism: the eradication of artificial differences 
between races, classes, and sexual identities; an end to the privileging of white, European cultures 
(and hi stories) over a host of non-European ones; and the abandonment of tired Modernist myths 
about improvement and progress, myths belied by the horrors which have typically accompanied 
them. 
5 
Now, there are more and less charitable ways to read Jenkins's argument, and the arguments oflhose 
he claims to represent. One of the least charitable of these (and self-admittedly so) can be foun _ din 
Richard Evans's, otherwise superb study 111 Defence of History, in which he attributes.J enkic:ns's 
iconoclasm to his being "only a lecturer in an institute of higher education, and so feels excllU-ded 
from the multi-million pound university institutions he is criticizing so aggressively" (199&, p. 2GC:l5). 
Evans 's point is that by critically oversimplifying the workings of culture and the institution: s of 
which it is comprised, Jenkins leaves himself open to precisely the same kind of reduclively cr-ude 
response as that which he levels at others. Evans reminds postmodernists that before they disp=nse 
with history out of hand, they need to know exactly what it is they are rejecting: "Like ffi _ any 
postmodemist critics of history, Jenkins lumps all historians together into a single cate~ory 
('bourgeois liberals') and refuses to recognize the enonnous variety of political and methodolog~ ical 
positions that characterize the profession as it is today" (ibid., p. 207). 
Be that as it may, it is clear that Jenkins, and those he cites as influences, have some gravearldprg ma 
facie legitimate reservations about the practice, about the very conditions of possibility, of hislCJry. 
It is equally clear that these reservations have a broad base of support in the profession at large. 'C'wo 
of these reservations concern me here, since they potentially complicate our abi lity to "read" the 
TRC historically, and thus to assess its contribution to nation building in South Africa. They =re, 
first, the fact that history has no specialized language of its own; and, second, that there are risk . s in 
subsuming local historical claims and arguments under larger, overarching metanarratives ~, in 
particular those conveying some sense of human forward momentum, or "progress". 
The language of historical discourse, as well as the language through which history is identified :and 
recovered (in documents, oral histories, etc.), has been foregrounded thanks to a "linguistic tum •• in 
historiography which began in the mid-1970s and which can be traced back to the work of Hayeden 
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White. White and his disciples, most notably Frank Ankersmit, have done much to re.confi gurelH:::1 
basic presumptions of historians vis-a.-vis their craft by alerting them to their de. pend.ence 0 <: 
language, both as a means of accessing the past and as a vehicle for (mis)representing it. I dOH" 
intend to spend much time detailing the specifics of this position here. Indeed I coulcd not hope ' \ 
do so in the time I have left and still do justice to the points of view I would be summarizing. I ] 
passing, however, let me just note that for White it is impossible for the histori an e...,erlO offer-= 
literally "true" account of some prior state of affairs since any statements made by historian swill tI b 
embedded in narratives in which both fictional and non-fictional communicativeeonventions obt~I[1n . 
In White's words: "narrative accounts do not consist only of factual statements (si ngul aredstenli:aal 
propositions) and arguments; they consist as well of poetic and rhetorical elements by which "~:aat 
would otherwise be a list of facts is trans fanned into a story" (1997, p. 393). On this vie:wall.Y singl;gle 
moment of history can give rise to an infinite number of competing (compatible and eontra.<iictory-y) 
accounts or "emplotments", and our decision about which of these to count as true will depend no_o t 
on some neutral evaluative criteria but rather on our overarching rhetorical strategy aJldairns. 
While White has often been misconstrued as advocating a more robust anti-realism t:han actuall i ly 
appears to be the case,3 the same cannot be said for his student Frank Ankersmit, one oft he moeost 
influential historicists working today. Ankersmit toes a strong narrativist and anti-realist lineJu-:-le 
terms "historism" and which is indebted to the postmodernism of Lyotard, de Certeau, and Derrid'L a. 
In his "Six Theses on Narrativist Philosophy of History", Ankersmit (1997, cited i n Jenkins. . 1999:0 ), 
offers a number of aphorisms indicative of his view that historical narrati ves paradoxically rnovellLls 
further away from the truth about prior actions and events . This view, and the widening ace eptanc =e 
of the epistemic scepticism it entails, marks the advent of what he has famously termedtlhe "iIluturnn~" 
'Cf. Jenkins's elaborate rebuttal of these criticisms in his Why History? Elhics an.ad 
Posrnlodemity (1999, pp. 115-20). 
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of Western historiography ("Historiography and postmodernism", 1997, p. 291). Consider, for 
example, the following aphorism related to Ankersmit' s claim that history properly aims to multipI y, 
not to reduce, the number of possible accounts of the past, thereby rendering epistemology as such 
irrelevant: 
5.3.5. Historiographical debate, ultimately, does not aim for agreement but for the 
proliferation of interpretive theses. The purpose of historiography is not the 
transformation of narrative things into real things (or their type concepts). On the 
contrary, it attempts to bring about the dissolution of what seems known and 
unproblematic. Its goal is not the reduction of the unknown to the known, but the 
estrangement of what seems so familiar ("Six Theses", 1999, cited in Jenkins, 1999, 
p.151). 
Ankersmit's aims in formulating his claims in this way are multiple and complex, but centrally 
involve his desire to repudiate the scientistic positivism characteristic of a kind of historiographical 
modernism which attempts to distinguish between available accounts of the past with reference to 
some stable notion of "what really happened". On the latter view it would be possible to determine 
not simply what happened in the past, but also what this happening meant; on Ankersmit's view such 
a reckoning would be impossible. 
Ankersmit's position impinges on a number of debates in epistemology, metaphysics, literary 
criticism and the sociology of knowledge. It also, however, bears significance for our thinking about 
ethics, for inasmuch as the narrativity of history is a representational problem, it is also a special 
kind of ethical one. When George Santayana proposed that those of us who forget the past are 
doomed to repeat it he was making the case that the study of the past teaches us not just simply about 
where we've come from, but also about how to get to where it is we would like to be (and what to 
look out for along the way). Without that past, however, or with the past only ever serving multiple 
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and contingent present ends (as strong presentists like Ankersmit and White would have it), ittt is 
unclear exactly what or how the past is supposed to teach us either about ourselves an d OUlf valL.les 
or about those belonging to people who aren't at all like us. For presentists the past cano:nly elAfer 
be present-confirming, ethically or otherwise. Put another way the question becomes: in the abseTlOce 
of a stable, non-contingent, historiographical frame of reference what kind of ethical roadrnaps=an 
we draw to guide us through our ongoing process of moral and cultural refinement? In cruciial wa:ays 
this is a question the presentists can't answer, Ankersmit' s claim to the ubiquity of ethics inruarrati i ve 
history notwithstanding' 
This recalls the second reservation cited above: the one involving suspicion of grand nUrTative:es, 
especially that of progress. Consistent with their postmodemist creed, and against high mudem: ist 
historians like Arnold Toynbee, for whom there were twenty-one civilizations in the past all of 
which passed through similar stages of growth, breakdown, and dissolution, presentists rejecttL he 
notion that patterns can be located in history which indicate a cultural trajectory of any Idnd.!'>As 
Ankersmit puts it: "Narrative interpretations are not necessarily of a sequential nature; histori=al 
narratives are only contingently stories with a beginning, a middle, and an end" ("Six Theses ", 19~9, 
cited in Jenkins , 1999, p. 144). Ankersmit's reference to contingency here undersco>res tlll1e 
importance of the "present" interpretive context to the strong presentist position. For what is 
contingent on this view is the claim by the historian to speak satta voce for the past orin anticipatiaon 
of the beliefs, desires, and needs of those living in the future . The presentist demands t hat t[he 
historian be agnostic, and silent, on both counts in a form of historical praxis termed by Gertruarle 
'''5.4.1. The historian is the professional 'outsider': the gap between himself and hi stori=al 
reality, which he is always attempting to bridge, is identical to the gap between the indi vidual !T'T"ld 
society, which ethics and political philosophy attempt to bridge. The ethical dimension mu.ast 
therefore be ubiquitous in historiography. Modem historiography is based on a political decisiocn" 
("Six Theses", 1999, cited in Jenkins, 1999, p. 152). 
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Himmelfarb (1997), "history at the pleasure of the historian " (p. 158). An important question ;arises 
from this conception of historical self-gratification, however: what of cultures which self· 
consciously desire progress, of groups of people anxious to learn from their mistakes .asa'peop~eand 
make a better world for themselves? Must their hopes for improvement be dismissed as one more 
modernist fantasy, or is there something that history-or historicism-can do to assist them in their 
social and moral reconstruction? 
The answer to these questions brings me back both to South Africa, and also to my thinlking ;about 
nationali sm, since it is pretty clear that political philosophers more or less agree that history ::plays 
a pivotal role in nation building. This agreement is longstanding, and at least on one read ing c;;an be 
shown to consist in an understanding of the nature of history now recognizable as "p>reserntist". 
Presentism underlies Renan's observation in the 1880s that the soul of a nation is constit uted Iby i~ 
past as well as by its present. By "present" here Renan means the day-to-day practices indicati ve ol 
a marked, self-conscious desire to work to preserve a shared set of interests, a heritage, a way od' life. 
The patterns of this way of life are detectable only through the lens of present concerns,and the past 
thus assumes for Renan a sort of manufactured character; it is enacted in the present via "an everyday 
plebiscite" (1994, p. 17), the decision of a public to continue to live together as a cormnunity ,and 
to affirm a shared culture structured around a stable, officially sanctioned past. 
More recently Eric Hobsbawm has written of the invention of traditions and of the attempa s by 
nation-builders to obscure the artificiality of their constructions. Recognition of this stra 'e~c 
disingenuousness similarly lies behind Ernest Gellner'S claim that "Nationali sm is not what its~elT" , 
and above all not what it seems to itself" (1994, p. 64). Gellner, like Hobsbawm, tracks the cre;;ati on 
of the stable "official" cultures so necessary for the creation of nations, at the heal1 of which al.....vays 
lies a sanctioned and sanitized history . Thus Renan's recognition that: 
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Man, sirs, does not improvise. The nation, even as the individual, is the end product:: 
of a long period of work, sacrifice and devotion. The worship of ancestors is • 
understandably justifiable, since our ancestors have made us what we are_ A h eroie -
past, of great men, of glory [ ... ], that is the social principle on which the national idea_ 
rests (1994, p. 17). 
This social principle, forged as it is out of the raw material of common experience and shared 
outlooks, is powerful enough on Renan 's view to overcome such local differences as those betv;een 
languages and tribes. 5 
The key feature of this process of history making which I would like to draw to your attention is that 
it operates free from certain epistemic constraints. It is not, in other words, necessary for the 
reconstructed past to be "true" or in any sense "to really have happened"_lt is enough for a people 
to consent (actively or passively) to a set of historical conventions for an imagined past to countas 
legitimate and therefore as defacto "true". Ulf Hedetoft (1995) recognizes this factual agnosticism 
when he defines history as : 
one out of many prerequisite source materials for the shape and contents of an 
actually resultant nationalist meaning- and sign-configuration, ego as various types 
of memory, whether fully, partially, or not at all in accordance with "what really 
happened", various potential image substances to hook on to, various events to be 
shaped or forgotten-negatively or positively identified wi th-emolionalized orrelated 
to in a more neutral, cognitive form (p. 337). 
Hence the significance of Benedict Anderson's claims concerning the correlation between the rise 
of print capitalism and the rise of nations, for it is especially in the pages of print-sources like 
'Oh but were it so! The recent fragmentation of the Balkans, as well as other violent 
national reconfigurations in Europe, Africa, and Asia, have underscored the optimism of Renan's 
formulation . 
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newspapers that communities are imagined and history is made (via the selection or non-selectiO!I1 
of events on which to report) . 
Against the background of this view of history and its importance to nation-building, what, then, are 
we to make of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission? The TRC came into being 
as a result of the constitutional negotiations preceding the first fully democratic elections in South 
Africa. In the final draft of the interim constitution there can be found the following passage- , 
included as a "post-amble" at the behest of F. W. de Klerk although sanctioned by Nelson Mandel:a 
as well : 
The adoption of this Constitution lays the secure foundation for the people of SOllth 
Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the past, which generated gross 
violations of human rights, the transgression of humanitarian principles in vi olen tt: 
conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge. These can now be addressed 
on the basis that there is a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for 
reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu [the African philosophy of 
humanism) but not for victimization. 
In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction , amnesty shall be grantedl 
in respect of acts, omissions, and offences associated with political objectives andl 
committed in the course of the conflicts of the past. To this end, Parliament under 
this Constitution shall adopt a law detennining a finn cut-off date which shaH be CD. 
date after 8 October 1990 and before 6 December 1993 and providing for 
mechanisms, criteria and procedures, including tribunals, if any, through which sllch 
amnesty shall be dealt with at any time after the law has been passed (cited frol11l 
Krogh, 1999, pp. ix-xii). 
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The ambiguous language of this passage testifies to the uncertainty amongst the bargaining parties 
over how far-reaching any amnesty process should be, as well as what form the decision-making 
mechanism for granting it should take. It is nonetheless clear that amnesty is held by all concerned 
to be a precondition for fluid political transformation in South Africa, and this for obvious reasons 
including the protection of executive officers in the outgoing and incoming regimes. Given the 
stakes in any amnesty process-stakes including the internationally crucial moral high ground-there 
remained for South Africans planning an amnesty procedure the requirement that they strike a 
delicate balance between the need for justice (ubuntu) and the practicalities of political and social 
reform. That this balance should ultimately be thought realizable through a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission shows at least a tacit commitment by its planners to the following line of reasoning: 
reconciliation is a prerequisite for national unity; amnesty in its turn is a prerequisite for 
reconciliation; and truth, in the form of full disclosure of prior bad acts, finally makes amnesty (as 
well as other forms of forgiveness) possible.6 As full disclosure, the kind of truth at issue for the 
TRC's amnesty committee was, strikingly, the truth about what really happened in the past. 
It seems noteworthy to me that at the heart of South Africa's post-apartheid reconstruction was a 
commitment to a philosophical notion of truth in history that seems at odds both with a historicist 
conception of history and the prevailing view amongst political philosophers conceming how elite 
publics manufacture a nation's past. That is, if we accept the view that the nation's past becomes 
recognizable as such not organically but deliberately and strategically, as the result of a carefully 
planned effort at institutionally entrenching some desired version of things as they really were, then 
'''Applicants would have to convince a panel of commissioners that their crimes had been 
camed out with a political obkective. In making their decision the commissioners would weight six 
factors, known as the 'Norgaard principles' : the motive; the objective; the context; whether the deed 
was authorized; its ' legal and factual nature'; and its proportionality to a political goal" (Meredith, 
1999, p. 21). 
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South Africa's departure from this model begs for further clarification and comment. At least on • . e 
crucial question comes to mind: why did South Africa predicate reconciliation (and thereforo-e 
national unity) on a positivistic conception of historical Truth? 
At least part of the answer to this question has to do with the violent legacy of apartheid, an d willi:h 
the state of the South African nation in the decade or so leading up to elections in 1994. TILis wa:_s 
an extremely murky period in the nation's history during which President P.W. Botha falI1ousl:!:y 
declared that in response to the "total onslaught" by communists against hi s white r egime Ihc:te 
government would generate a "total strategy" for dealing with the threat (Meredith, 1999, !p. 16)0 . 
This strategy included the arrest and detainment without trial of hundreds of black comrnunilyy 
leaders , church workers, student activists, and union officials. It also included cross-border raids onn 
ANC bases in neighbouring countries, and the training of rebel groups in countries like ZimlbabwElie 
with governments sympathetic to the struggle for black liberation. Most seriously, though, "tota.~l 
strategy" included the funding of covert police and military groups responsible for the t ortu re and 
murder of political opponents as well as the training of militant black organizations like the ZulLJ 
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) hostile to the ANC. These latter strategies were never f~rrnaJl}Ol 
acknowledged by the white government either under Botha or under his successor F.W. De ](Ierk= , 
and so remained "outside" history for the bulk of the white population. But "total strategy" wa~ 
understood by blacks to be part of their history, the denials of the white establish men· t 
notwithstanding.7 
'In 1989 the commission headed by Supreme Court Judge Louis Banns was appointed tc:l 
investigate claims by Dirk Coetzee and Almond Nofomela that the government operated death 
squads responsible for the murder of political dissidents. In a process described as "largely a farce' • • 
(Meredith,1999, p. 34), the commission essentially vindicated the state security apparatus. 
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At issue in this difference of historical perspectives is identity itself. In so saying I am agreeing """'ith 
philosophers like Charles Taylor who suggest that our understanding of the past and of our pla=e in 
it helps to give shape to the "horizons of significance" against which our moral sense and "authe~tic" 
inner selves develop and mature. Thus different shared personal histories-at least insofarai> they- can 
be said to differ over such vital details as whether or not injustice has occurred and suffering- has 
been real-give rise to different group identities or communities, and consequently to large num:ibers 
of people nominally unable to recognize one another as fundamentally the same sort of beings-in-
the-world. Hence Thabo Mbeki 's observation that apartheid caused South Africans to "lose their 
humanity" (quoted in Krogh, 1999, p. 77). Mbeki means "loss" here in two senses: whites lost their 
humanity under apartheid because of the crimes they committed against blacks; blacks l ost their 
humanity in tum because of the failure of whites to recognize or care about the extent of their 
suffering. The recognition of the scale oftheselosses underwrites Mbeki's conclusion that the "c::>nly 
thing that will heal this country is large doses of truth ... and the truth is that apartheid was a foron of 
genocide and a crime against humanity" (quoted in Krogh, 1999, pp. 76-77). In the wake of so uch 
sentiments the TRC's primary responsibility became to recover the truth about the past in sllch a ......,ay 
that its veracity would be left beyond dispute. The acknowledgement of this truth could then becc::>me 
the basis for precisely the mutual recognition and cultural rapprochement essential for tile proper 
functioning of democracy in South Africa. 
The TRC as it finally came to be offered three advantages to those concerned with guaranteeing: the 
truth of history. First, it was committed to the principle of publicity, and its meetings were ope:n to 
the public and broadcast across the country on radio and TV. It also issued its findings in a massi ve 
3500 page report, although high black illiteracy rates rendered this mode of disseminali<>n on:Iy a 
qualified success. Second, the TRC managed to name names while still holding to general standards 
of legal due process, thus guaranteeing the perception of its procedural neutrality . This perception 
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was crucial to maintain given the strong reservations about its mission held by nearly everyone 
subject to its scrutiny: the ANC objected to having their transgressions considered on a par with 
those of the white state; Afrikaners objected to their under-representation on the Commission and 
claimed that it was overwhelmingly pro-ANC; the IFP objected that the TRC was a showcase for 
the ANC, and claimed that the whole process of Commission hearings resembled Stalin's show trials 
of the 1930s. And yet the TRC guaranteed due process by pre-interviewing all those scheduled to 
testify in public and by notifying those they accused in order to allow them to defend themselves; 
they provided lawyers to those unable to pay for their own; and they informed all of those accused 
in the commission's final report well in advance of its publication so that they had time to appeal 
the TRC's assessment. Third, the Commission did not remain primarily concerned with the official 
acknowledgement of past misdeeds by government, military, and police leaders, and instead made 
a concerted effort to hear the stories and document the atrocities of individual perpetrators all the 
way down the line. This level of attention allowed for details to become publically known about 
hundreds of cases which would otherwise have remained unacknowledged, unresolved, and 
consequently unhistorical. 
And yet despite these procedural precautions the TRC has generally been viewed as a failure by 
South Africans , regardless of their race or political affiliation. There are many causes for complaint'. 
Problems with the reconciliation process which Martin Meredith identifies in his study of the 
Commission include: the fact that the media coverage of the TRC was viewed and heard mostly by 
non-whites; what coverage whites did hear was fragmentary and led to the perception that there was 
more to the story of the anti-apartheid struggle than Afrikaaner brutality; indeed the more brutal the 
crimes being reported the more it became possible for the white audience to distance themse lves 
'Cf. Martin Meredith (1999), Coming To Terms and Antjie Krogh (1999), Country of My 
Skull. 
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from their perpetrators. Finally, the TRC violated its mandate for neutrality in a nurnber of 
controversial decisions including the granting in 1997, without explanation, of a blanketarnnesty 
to thirty-seven ANC leaders including Thabo Mbeki . The TRC's handling of Winnie Mandela IV"" as 
similarly disturbing, to blacks and to whites alike. The following statistics suggest the ex-tent to 
which whites perceived the TRC to be a failure: 
In a survey carried out in July 1998, some 72 percent of whites felt that the TRC h.ad 
made race relations worse; almost 70 percent felt that the TRC would not help SOlD..th 
Africans to live together more harmoniously in the future; and some 83 percent o f 
Afrikaners and 71 percent of English-speaking whites believed the TRC to be biasaed 
(Meredith,1999, pp. 314-5). 
The TRC's effects were predictably more profoundly transformative for blacks, since it provided!. a 
sanctioned public forum for airing black grievances and pain for the first time in living memory. B ut 
even amongst blacks its success was not uniformly conceded. Particularly hurtful to blacks was to,e 
refusal of F. W. de Klerk to take responsibility for the actions of his subordinates, since it irupJiced 
a rejection of the claim that the state itself, and not simply some of its servants, was behind rears <of 
cruelty and abuse. Nor was the amnesty granted by the Commission always viewed wi t h 
understanding by victims of violence, as when Dirk Coetzee, the commander Vlakp1aas, one of <of 
the apartheid regime's most notorious death squads, was allowed to escape criminal an d civ-il 
prosecution. Additional criticisms were levelled at the TRC by those unhappy with the time peric:>d 
it was mandated to cover: all political acts committed since the Sharpeville massacre in 1960. F <Of 
many this chronological delimiting suggested, contrary to facts, that criminally racist behaviDur w.as 
a relatively recent invention in South Africa. 
This last objection underscores once more for me the extent to which the TRC can be shO\VJl to fail 
insofar as it remained unable, finally, to bridge the distance between competing answers to the 
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question of what really happened under apartheid. A great deal hinged on the TRC' s ability to affect 
such a rehabilitation, not least the mutual intelligibility of antagonists and their concomit~nt 
recognition of one another as similarly human: linguistic, racial and social disti nctions 
notwithstanding. I follow Rawls in finding this recognition of shared humanity central to thecreati on 
of free and equal persons under the law, and hence a precondition for justice as fairness, the latter 
considered a principle which "provides a pubJically recognized point of view from which all citizens 
can examine before one another whether or not their political and social institutions are just" (1997, 
p. 394). Just institutions are necessary for the proper functioning of any multicultural state, and 
particularly for states like South Africa which wish to become fully democratic. The kind of 
informed and willing political agreement required for justice as fairness, though, presupposes a 
conception of citizens as free and equal persons, a conception of personhood entailing in tum a 
public recognition of individuals' authentic identities understood against the backdrop of historicaJly 
informed horizons of significance.' 
I wish to conclude by noting once again my agreement with the claim that nations are const ructed, 
as are their histories. Indeed much of what I have been accounting for here confirms the propositi on 
that the nation and its history can perhaps best be thought of as reciprocally sustaining. But to 
acknowledge this does not entail the necessity or the inevitability of historicism, despite the plurality 
of true histories present within a nation at anyone given point in time. On this point I am iIlclirred 
to follow Hobsbawm's rejection of historicism and claim that the historian's first "duty" is to "res ist 
the formation of national, ethnic and other myths as they are being formed" (1998, p. 11). To fail to 
do so is to put history in the service of politics and hence at the mercy of contingent local passions 
and interests the byproducts of which can be horrific. Something like this belief motivates Richard 
Evans to claim that "French history is too important a matter to be left to the French, German history 
'For a more substantial version of this claim see Mohanty (1997), Chapter 7. 
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has affected other histories too greatly for it to be left to the Germans" (1998, p . 214). It is precisely 
in virtue of the multiple perspectives possibly brought to bear on events that it becomes possible to 
guarantee historical truth.'o This guarantee of historical truth reveals history's ethical character, since 
it prevents the failures of recognition common in multicultural environments like Bosnia and 
Northern Ireland" in which the consequences of such failures have been demonstrated time and 
again, and again. Recognition in tum guarantees personal identity such that it becomes possible for 
persons to meet as equals in debates over the nature of the common good. Figuring prominentl yin 
these debates, of course, will be the precise form the institutions of a nation-state must assume to 
ensure the fair treatment of all its citizens, regardless of their color or creed. This "fair treatment" 
is nothing less than what we more commonly tenn "justice". The failure of the TRe, then, can be 
seen as a failure to specify-at least in some substantial part-what justice might look like in the "new", 
multicultural, South Africa. 
"This claim is related to Robert Merton 's (1993) argument that what he tenos "universalism" 
guarantees the objectivity of science. 
"Cf. Michael Ignatieff (1993), Blood and Belonging, Chapters I and 6. 
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